Oft-quoted constitutional provisions enshrined in Articles
86[1] and 175[2] nowhere envisages a “secret
ballot” to choose a Leader of the House or to support/oppose a
confidence/no-confidence motion for/against a Council of Ministers in the
Legislative Assembly. The very idea of “secret ballot” for this purpose falls
foul of Para 2, sub para 1 (b) of the 10th schedule of the Constitution[3]
(incorporating the binding dictate of the whip) and thus ravishes the spirit of
the anti-defection law.
It is true that in Rameshwar Prasad Chaurasia Case of
2006 (Bihar Assembly Dissolution Case), the Supreme Court of India observed to
the effect that “The Governor must not be allowed to take the plea that no
Government can be formed, unless he exhausts all possible options, INCLUDING
THE ONE OF THE ASKING THE HOUSE ITSELF TO ELECT ITS LEADER”. However, no
mention of “secret ballot” in the said judgment.
In the much touted case of Jagdambika Pal vs Union Of
India And Ors. of 1998 (UP Assembly Case), the Supreme Court said that there
should be a composite floor-test in the House, and it should be peaceful
without disturbance. The floor test happened. The test involved each member
casting a vote declaring his support to either candidate and signing on the
ballot paper. In all, 422 votes were cast, but one member deviated from the
prescribed procedure and instead of signing on the ballot paper, he put a tick
mark against Kalyan Singh’s name. Therefore, his vote was not counted. Thus, no
votes that were without a name and signature were admitted.
NOTE:
a). SECRET
BALLOTS FOR CHOOSING HOUSE OF LEADER - INNOVATION IN HORSE-TRADING AND WHAT'S
NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH OPEN BALLOT WILL BE MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH SECRET BALLOT.
b). Confidence vote through secret ballots would be death knell for multi-party parliamentary democracy.
c). THUGS will hold every PM/CM to ransom.
b). Confidence vote through secret ballots would be death knell for multi-party parliamentary democracy.
c). THUGS will hold every PM/CM to ransom.
86. Right of President to address and send messages to
Houses
(1) The
President may address either House of Parliament or both Houses assembled
together, and for that purpose require the attendance of members
(2) The
President may send messages to either House of Parliament, whether with respect
to a Bill then pending in Parliament or otherwise, and a House to which any
message is so sent shall with all convenient dispatch consider any matter
required by the message to be taken into consideration.
175. Right of Governor to address and send messages to
the House or Houses
(1) The
Governor may address the Legislative Assembly or, in the case of a State having
a Legislative Council, either House of the Legislature of the State, or both
Houses assembled together, and may for that purpose require the attendance of
members
(2) The
Governor may sent messages to the House or Houses of the Legislature of the
State, whether with respect to a Bill then pending in the Legislature or
otherwise, and a House to which any message is so sent shall with all
convenient dispatch consider any matter required by the message to be taken
into consideration
[3] . Tenth Schedule in the Indian Constitution
Clause 2. Disqualification on
ground of defection.—(1)
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging
to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House—
(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or
(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction
issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority
authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior
permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or
abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority
within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention.
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