CASE STUDY
All Women and Minor(s) independently of the Adult Male Member(s) can be Tried for Domestic Violence
Hiral P. Harsora and Ors. v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and Ors
Civil Appeal No. 10084 of 2016, arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9132 of 2015, decided on October 6, 2016 by the Hon’ble Supreme of India.
QUESTION OF LAW BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:
In the above appeal an important question as to the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (hereinafter referred to as “the 2005 Act”) inasmuch as that the expression “adult male person” employed therein is a classification not based on any intelligible differentia, and not having any rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act arose before the Supreme Court of India.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF APPEAL:
On 3.4.2007, Kusum Narottam Harsora and her mother Pushpa Narottam Harsora filed a complaint under the 2005 Act against Pradeep, the brother/son, and his wife, and two sisters/daughters, alleging various acts of violence against them. The said complaint was withdrawn on 27.6.2007 with liberty to file a fresh complaint. Nothing happened for over three years till the same duo of mother and daughter filed two separate complaints against the same respondents in October, 2010. An application was moved before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for a discharge of respondent Nos. 2 to 4 stating that as the complaint was made under Section 2(a) read with Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, it can only be made against an adult male person and the three respondents not being adult male persons were, therefore, required to be discharged. The Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order dated 5.1.2012 in which such discharge was refused.
In a writ petition filed against the said order, on 15.2.2012, the Bombay High Court, on a literal construction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three respondents from the complaint. The said order attained finality since it was not appealed against.
However, mother and daughter filed a writ petition in Bombay High Court, being writ petition No.300/2013, in which the constitutional validity of Section 2(q) was challenged. Though the writ petition was amended, there was no prayer seeking any interference with the order dated 15.2.2012, which, as has already been stated hereinabove, has attained finality. The Bombay High Court by the impugned judgment dated 25.9.2014 held that Section 2(q) needs to be read down in the following manner:-
“In view of the above discussion and in view of the fact that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kusum Lata Sharma's case has not been disturbed by the Supreme Court, we are inclined to read down the provisions of section 2(q) of the DV Act and to hold that the provisions of "respondent" in section 2(q) of the DV Act is not to be read in isolation but has to be read as a part of the scheme of the DV Act, and particularly along with the definitions of "aggrieved person", “domestic relationship" and "shared household" in clauses (a), (f) and (s) of section 2 of the DV Act. If so read, the complaint alleging acts of domestic violence is maintainable not only against an adult male person who is son or brother, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved complainant- mother or sister, but the complaint can also be filed against a relative of the son or brother including wife of the son / wife of the brother andsisters of the male respondent. In other words, in our view, the complaint against the daughter-in-law, daughters or sisters would be maintainable under the provisions of the DV Act, where they are co-respondent/ s in a complaint against an adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the complainant and such co-respondent/s. It must, of course, be held that a complaint under the DV Act would not be maintainable against daughter-in-law, sister-in- law or sister of the complainant, if no complaint is filed against an adult male person of the family.”
RELEVENT LEGAL PROVISIONS:
The relevant provisions of the statute are contained in the following Sections:
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;
(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
(s) “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.
3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or
commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it—
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any
other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—
1. Any relief available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person
and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
2. Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.
3. In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.
Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31 deal with the right to reside in a shared household, Protection orders, Residence orders, Monetary relief, Custody orders, Compensation orders, Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent respectively.
OBSERVATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
MALE vis-à-vis FEMALE and DAUGHTER/SISTER vis-à-vis DAUGHTER-IN-LAW/SISTER-IN -LAW
The definition of “domestic relationship” contained in Section 2(f) is a very wide one. It is a relationship between persons who live or have lived together in a shared household and are related in any one of four ways -blood, marriage or a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or family members of a joint family. A reading of these definitions makes it clear that domestic relationships involve persons belonging to both sexes and includes persons related by blood or marriage. This necessarily brings within such domestic relationships male as well as female in-laws, quite apart from male and female members of a family related by blood. Equally, a shared household includes a household which belongs to a joint family of which the respondent is a member. The Hindu Succession Act,1956 was amended, by which Section 6 was amended, with effect from 9.9.2005, to make females coparceners of a joint Hindu family and so have a right by birth in the property of such joint family. This being the case, when a member of a joint Hindu family will now include a female coparcener as well, the restricted definition contained in Section 2(q) has necessarily to be given a relook, given that the definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the Act would include a household which may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member. The aggrieved person can therefore make, after 2006, her sister, for example, a respondent, if the Hindu Succession Act amendment is to be looked at. But such is not the case under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, as the main part of Section 2(q) continues to read “adult male person”, while Section 2(s) would include such female coparcener as a respondent, being a member of a joint family. This is one glaring anomaly which we have to address in the course of our judgment.
When Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence, it is clear that such violence is gender neutral. It is also clear that physical abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse and economic abuse can all be by women against other women. Even sexual abuse may, in a given fact circumstance, be by one woman on another. Section 3, therefore, in tune with the general object of the Act, seeks to outlaw domestic violence of any kind against a woman, and is gender neutral. When one goes to the remedies that the Act provides, things become even clearer. Section 17(2) makes it clear that the aggrieved person cannot be evicted or excluded from a shared household or any part of it by the “respondent” save in accordance with the procedure established by law. If “respondent” is to be read as only an adult male person, it is clear that women who evict or exclude the aggrieved person are not within its coverage, and if that is so, the object of the Act can very easily be defeated by an adult male person not standing in the forefront, but putting forward female persons who can therefore evict or exclude the aggrieved person from the shared household. This again is an important indicator that the object of the Act will not be sub-served by reading “adult male person” as “respondent”.
This becomes even clearer from certain other provisions of the Act. Under Section 18(b), for example, when a protection order is given to the aggrieved person, the “respondent” is prohibited from aiding or abetting the commission of acts of domestic violence. This again would not take within its ken females who may be aiding or abetting the commission of domestic violence, such as daughters-in-law and sisters-in-law, and would again stultify the reach of such protection orders. When we come to Section 19 and residence orders that can be passed by the Magistrate, Section 19(1)(c) makes it clear that the Magistrate may pass a residence order, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, and may restrain the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides. This again is a pointer to the fact that a residence order will be toothless unless the relatives, which include female relatives of the respondent, are also bound by it. And we have seen from the definition of “respondent” that this can only be the case when a wife or a common law wife is an aggrieved person, and not if any other woman belonging to a family is an aggrieved person. Therefore, in the case of a wife or a common law wife complaining of domestic violence, the husband’s relatives including mother-in-law and sister-in-law can be arrayed as respondents and effective orders passed against them. But in the case of a mother-in law or sister-in-law who is an aggrieved person, the respondent can only be an “adult male person” and since his relatives are not within the main part of the definition of respondent in Section 2(q), residence orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 19(1) (c) against female relatives of such person would be unenforceable as they cannot be made parties to petitions under the Act.
When we come to Section 20, it is clear that a Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person, of various kinds, mentioned in the Section. If the respondent is only to be an “adult male person”, and the money payable has to be as a result of domestic violence, compensation due from a daughter-in-law to a mother-in-law for domestic violence inflicted would not be available, whereas in a converse case, the daughter-in-law, being a wife, would be covered by the proviso to Section 2(q) and would consequently be entitled to monetary relief against her husband and his female relatives, which includes the mother-in-law.
When we come to Section 26 of the Act, the sweep of the Act is such that all the innovative reliefs available under Sections 18 to 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding
before a civil court, family court or criminal court affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent. The proceeding in the civil court, family court or criminal court may well include female members of a family, and reliefs sought in those legal proceedings would not be restricted by the definition of “respondent” in the 2005 Act. Thus, an invidious discrimination will result, depending upon whether the aggrieved person chooses to institute proceedings under the 2005 Act or chooses to add to the reliefs available in either a pending proceeding or a later proceeding in a civil court, family court or criminal court.
It is clear that there is no intelligible differentia between a proceeding initiated under the 2005 Act and proceeding initiated in other fora under other Acts, in which the self-same reliefs grantable under this Act, which are restricted to an adult male person, are grantable by the other fora also against female members of a family. This anomaly again makes it clear that the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) is not based on any intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act. The restriction of such person to being an adult male alone is obviously not a differentia which would be in sync with the object sought to be achieved under the 2005 Act, but would in fact be contrary to it.
ADULT vis-à-vis MINOR
Also, the expression “adult” would have the same effect of stultifying orders that can be passed under the aforesaid sections. It is not difficult to conceive of a non-adult 16 or 17 year old member of a household who can aid or abet the commission of acts of domestic violence, or who can evict or help in evicting or excluding from a shared household an aggrieved person. Also, a residence order which may be passed under Section 19(1)(c) can get stultified if a 16 or 17 year, all of which would only lead to the conclusion that even the expression “adult” in the main part is Section 2(q) is restrictive of the object sought to be achieved by the kinds of orders that can be passed under the Act and must also be, therefore, struck down, as this word contains the same old relative enters the portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides after a restraint order is passed against the respondent and any of his adult relatives. Examples can be multiplied discriminatory vice that is found with its companion expression “male”.
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION, DOCTRINES OF SEVERABILITY and READING DOWN/UP:
Article 14. Equality before law. - The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
Article 14 is in two parts. The expression “equality before law” is borrowed from the Irish Constitution, which in turn is borrowed from English law, and has been described in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14, as the negative aspect of equality. The “equal protection of the laws” in Article 14 has been borrowed from the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and has been described in the same judgment as the positive aspect of equality namely the protection of equal laws. Subba Rao, J. stated:
“This subject has been so frequently and recently before this court as not to require an extensive consideration. The doctrine of equality may be briefly stated as follows: All persons are equal before the law is fundamental of every civilized constitution. Equality before law is a negative concept; equal protection of laws is a positive one. The former declares that every one is equal before law, that no one can claim special privileges and that all classes are equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land; the latter postulates an equal protection of all alike in the same situation and under like circumstances. No discrimination can be made either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities imposed. But these propositions conceived in the interests of the public, if logically stretched too far, may not achieve the high purpose behind them. In a society of unequal basic structure, it is well nigh impossible to make laws suitable in their application to all the persons alike. So, a reasonable classification is not only permitted but is necessary if society should progress. But such a classification cannot be arbitrary but must be based upon differences pertinent to the subject in respect of and the purpose for which it is made.”
The Court dealt with several cases cited before it by both sides on Article 14, reading down, and the severability principle in constitutional law viz. Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305; Re: Special Courts Bill, (1979) 2 SCR 476; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621; Rattan Arya and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, (1986) 3 SCC 385;Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682; Union of Indiav. N.S. Ratnam, (2015) 10 SCC 681)
In Subramanian Swamy v. CBI (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court struck down Section 6A of the Delhi Police Special Establishment Act on the ground that it made an invidious distinction between employees of the Central Government of the level of Joint Secretary and above as against other Government servants. This Court, after discussing various judgments dealing with the principle of discrimination (when a classification does not disclose an intelligible differentia in relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act) from para 38 onwards, ultimately held that the aforesaid classification defeats the purpose of finding prima facie truth in the allegations of graft and corruption against public servants generally, which is the object for which the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was enacted.
Then Supreme Court turned to the doctrine of severability - a doctrine well-known in constitutional law and propounded for the first time in the celebrated R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930. The crux of the said doctrine is that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible. This judgment has been applied in many cases since then.
The doctrine of reading down in constitutional adjudication is well settled. Justice Sawant in a Constitution Bench Judgment of Supreme Court in DTC v. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1) SCC stated: “It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible—one rendering it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intention of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine can never be called into play is where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so”.
In B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N., (2001) 7 SCC 231, Supreme Court dealing with the provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951 held that Section 8(4) opens with the words “notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)”, and it applies only to sitting members of Legislatures. There is no challenge to it on the basis that it violates Article 14. If there were, it might be tenable to contend that legislators stand in a class apart from non-legislators, but we need to express no final opinion. In any case, if it were found to be violative of Article 14, it would be struck down in its entirety. There would be, and is no question of so reading it that its provisions apply to all, legislators and non legislators, and that, therefore, in all cases the disqualification must await affirmation of the conviction and sentence by a final court. That would be “reading up” the provision, not “reading down”, and that is not known to the law.”
SUPREME COURT HELD THUS:
Relying upon the above judgments the Supreme Court held that the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in the Subramanian Swamy judgment, the words “adult male person” are contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic violence “of any kind”. The Supreme Court, therefore, struck down the words “adult male” before the word “person” in Section 2(q), as these words discriminate between persons similarly situate, and far from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act. Having struck down these two words from the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q), the next question that arises is whether the rest of the Act can be implemented without the aforesaid two words. An application of the aforesaid severability principle would make it clear that having struck down the expression “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the Act is left intact and can be enforced to achieve the object of the legislation without the offending words.
Under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, while defining ‘respondent’, a proviso is provided only to carve out an exception to a situation of “respondent” not being an adult male. Once the words ‘adult male’ are struck down, the proviso has no independent existence, having been rendered otiose.
The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court and declared that the words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered otiose, also stands deleted.
With the above observations, the appeal was disposed off accordingly.
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